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I. INTRODUCTION
Admittedly, the first analytic forays into popular legal culture,' espe-
cially including research on law and film, 2 did not initially make much of a
dent in American legal scholarship. One law professor, Kenneth Lasson of
the University of Baltimore, even expressed skepticism regarding the intel-
lectual value of such research on the basis of the title of one published essay
in the field.3 Lasson, himself the author of an oddly titled law book, Mouse-
traps and Muffling Cups, inspired another law review essayist, Oklahoma
City attorney Michael D. McClintock, to adopt an equivalently shorthand
approach, questioning the value of research into American legal culture sim-
ply by reproducing Lasson's original list of presumably dopey article titles.
The sarcasm of Lasson and McClintock's writing style appeared to eclipse
the sincerity of their argument.
Where Lasson had adroitly removed author information, McClintock
deleted entire citations, making it impossible for readers to decide for them-
+ At the author's request, Nova Law Review has retained the informal essay format of
this article and thus deviated from standard procedure with regard to providing sources for
each of the textual references employed.
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center.
1. See, e.g., Anthony Chase, Toward a Legal Theory of Popular Culture, 1986 Wis. L.
REV. 527 (1986); Anthony Chase, Lawyers and Popular Culture: A Review of Mass Media
Portrayals of American Attorneys, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 281 (1986).
2. See Anthony Chase, An Obscure Scandal of Consciousness, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
105 (1988).
3. Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure,
103 HARV. L. REv. 926, 930-31 (1990). Lasson's essay is routinely cited for the proposition
that legal scholarship is partly a consequence of pressure to obtain academic tenure, though so
mundane a fact was no doubt appreciated by most of those reading what Lasson wrote before-
hand. The real trick is to take the next step and provide a socioeconomic explanation of why
law schools were integrated into institutions (universities) which required academic scholar-
ship of legal professionals in the first place. See Anthony Chase, The Legal Scholar as Pro-
ducer, 13 NoVA L. REV. 57, 65 (1988).
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selves whether the suspect titles had been drawn from articles worth read-
ing.4 But good things come to those, including Lasson and McClintock, who
wait, and a confluence of factors ranging from the dramatic rise of culture
studies within the late-twentieth century American college curriculum
through the ubiquity of legal culture in American society have, after almost
two decades, brought the study of law and popular culture into legal acade-
mia's mainstream.5 "Mass-mediated images," argue Austin Sarat, Lawrence
Douglas, and Martha Merrill Umphrey, "are as powerful, pervasive, and im-
portant as are other early twenty-first-century social forces-for example,
globalization, neo-colonialism, and human rights-in shaping and transform-
ing legal life."6 This realization seems to have taken hold both inside and
outside law schools.
Published in 2002, Movies on Trial: The Legal System on the Silver
Screen7 illustrates one way of approaching legal culture, giving special focus
to different cinematic genres dealing with law and lawyers.8 Therein the
reader will find, for example, a brief discussion of why there have been so
few motion pictures and television series based upon the workings of the
United States Supreme Court or devoted to an exploration of constitutional
law and practice. But there has developed an important if carefully circum-
scribed narrative tradition in both fiction and film dealing with the American
Revolution, an event from which constitution-making in the United States is
inseparable, as well as with the historical context within which the origins of
American constitutional government must be situated.9
The same holds true for France. While French cinema has rarely given
focus to French appellate practice or constitutional decision-making, the
French Revolution has been a popular subject of French movies and mass
entertainment. As a companion piece to what has already been written about
the popular culture of the American Revolution, this essay confronts one of
the ways the French Revolution has been portrayed in French motion pic-
4. Michael D. McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An
Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659, 674 (1998).
5. See, e.g., LEGAL REELISM: MOVIES AS LEGAL TEXTS (John Denvir ed., 1996); PAUL
BERGMAN & MICHAEL AsIMOw, REEL JUSTICE: THE COURTROOM GOES TO THE MOVIES
(1996); LAW AND FILM (Stefan Machura & Peter Robson eds., 2001); STEVE GREENFIELD ET
AL., FILM AND THE LAW (2001); RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP: THE VANISHING
LINE BETWEEN LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE (2000); MICHAEL ASIMOW & SHANNON MADER,
LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE (2004).
6. LAW ON THE SCREEN I (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2005).
7. See ANTHONY CHASE, MOVIES ON TRIAL: THE LEGAL SYSTEM ON THE SILVER SCREEN
(2002).
8. Id. at 35-66.
9. Id.
[Vol. 30:2:209
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tures and suggests that interpretation of such "mass-mediated images" can
help shed light on the fundamental character of French law and politics.
II. END OF AN AFFAIR?
The U.S.-French relationship has, of course, become enormously con-
troversial since the French failed to support the United States in its decision
to invade Iraq in 2003. At one level, the dispute between the two countries is
said to turn on a sharp divide over the relationship between the Iraq war, the
United Nations, and international law. On this view, the French are made
uncomfortable by the Bush administration's embrace of a unilateralist policy
in foreign affairs, especially including the invasion of Iraq, and by the two
nations' contrary views of how international law should be applied to the
circumstances of Iraq's alleged efforts to develop weapons of mass destruc-
tion, and its relationship to international terrorism.
With respect to the first issue, I have elsewhere sought to show that
claims of a new unilateralism in American foreign policy are greatly exag-
gerated.1° And the United States has pursued a self-interested foreign policy
quite consistently since the end of the Second World War. It would, for ex-
ample, be silly to argue that America's war in Vietnam was somehow less
"unilateral" than the recent invasion of Iraq. As to the second issue, how
international law should be applied to American conduct, I have also sought
elsewhere to demonstrate that international law has in common with other
kinds of law a certain flexibility which permits arguments to be marshaled-
and marshaled convincingly-on both sides of most major international dis-
putes, including the Iraq war." Both the United States and France, their dip-
lomats and lawyers, understand this and are well aware of the fact that legal
arguments are not at the heart of the friction between the two nations over
Iraq.
While it is true that the United Nations Security Council did not sanc-
tion the United States' use of military force against Saddam Hussein in 2003
(in contrast to the Gulf War of 1990-91), the U.N. also failed to approve the
use of military force by NATO in Bosnia to combat the "ethnic cleansing"
practiced by Slobodan Milosevic's Serbian regime-and in that instance, the
French not only approved the use of force but were themselves participants
in its deployment. The lack of correspondence between NATO's use of
force in Bosnia and what Secretary General Kofi Annan refers to as the
10. Anthony Chase, Some Realism About Unilateralism, 28 NOVA L. REV. 631 (2004).
11. Anthony Chase, Marxism and International Law, Historical Materialism (forthcom-
ing 2006).
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"U.N. paradigm" did not trouble the French when the human rights of Alba-
nian Kosovars were on the line.
To be sure, American pundits like Ann Coulter are quick to assert that
the real difference between the United States and France is simply that
Americans have the backbone to stand up for liberty and the French do not.
12
With regard to President Ronald Reagan's bombing of Tripoli, for example,
in an effort to discourage Libya's sponsorship of terrorism, the French did
not, in Coulter's view, rise to the occasion. "Quaking in the face of
[Reagan's] show of manly force," she writes, "France denied America the
use of its airspace. As a consequence, American pilots were required to be-
gin their missions from airbases in Britain."' 3 Nevertheless, some important
facts are omitted from Coulter's rendition of events. Neither France's air-
space in the bombing of Tripoli, nor its Security Council vote in the United
Nations at the time of the Iraq invasion were even important to the success of
American military operations, let alone essential to them.
It was a very different story in Vietnam, however, when France's own
war was very much in doubt and the United States held all the cards. For-
eign correspondent John Newhouse records that in April 1954, the position
of the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu was hopeless. "By then, [the U.S.
Navy's] Admiral Radford had reported the conclusion of an 'advance study
group' in the Pentagon: 'Three tactical A-weapons, properly employed,
would be sufficient to smash the Vietminh effort there.""' 14 The Vietminh
was the fighting force assembled by Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese com-
munists, under the leadership of General Vo Nguyen Giap, for the purpose of
resisting a continuation of French colonial domination in Southeast Asia. "In
Paris," continues Newhouse, "the French military were counting on Ameri-
can military intervention, which alone could head off the loss of their colony.
Radford, they felt, had promised aerial strikes against enemy positions."' 5
The air strikes were not forthcoming, nor were the three tactical nuclear
weapons the Pentagon's "advance study group" rather optimistically pre-
dicted could eliminate the Vietnamese resistance. 6 Nor was a miracle that
the French suffered one of the most humiliating military defeats in their na-
12. Ann Coulter, Attack France!, TOWNHALL.COM, Dec. 20, 2001, http://www.townhall.
com/opinion/columns/anncoulter/2001/12/20/161943.htmil.
13. Id.
14. JOHN NEWHOUSE, WAR AND PEACE I' THE NUCLEAR AGE 100 (1989) (quoting DAVID
ALAN STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLmCS: WHY THE REAGEN REVOLUTION FAILED 380
(1986)).
15. Id. (citation omitted).
16. Id.
[Vol. 30:2:209
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tional history at the hands of the communists at Dien Bien Phu.17 Ironically,
the United States itself, twenty years later, would suffer military defeat when
confronted with these same tenacious Vietnamese patriots. But the point to
be made here is that France could certainly be forgiven for feeling "be-
trayed" by an America unwilling to fight or, at least, unwilling to fight when
French national pride hung in the balance in Southeast Asia.
At times France has come to the aid of the United States (e.g., Lafayette
during the Revolution) and at times Americans have fought to save France
(as in World War II); there have also been times when each nation pursued a
course of action that bitterly disappointed the other. So what is the current
falling out between America and France actually about? In the wake of an
obviously acrimonious United Nations debate between the two countries in
2003, a series of bitter tracts have appeared, each entry in the line claiming a
fundamental irreconcilability between American and French interests, each
failing to identify the historical terrain on which fundamental differences
invariably are fought out, substituting a list of carefully selected events-
especially recent ones-which obviously fortify rather than subvert their
main line of argument. 8 Such pop comparative history or jerry-rigged inter-
national relations theory is of little lasting value.
III. READING HISTORY
There are fundamental differences between French and American po-
litical histories and cultures, but they are not likely to be rationally explored
in books ready-made for an anti-French (or anti-Frenchfries) American read-
ing public whose prejudices seem easily enflamed by publishing houses
looking for a fast buck, occasionally willing to stoke any xenophobic bonfire.
Until the last two decades of the twentieth century, a familiar debate in the
social sciences turned on the issue of American Exceptionalism.1 9 It is, to be
sure, beyond dispute that since the arrival in New England of white European
settlers in the seventeenth century, Americans had regarded themselves as
somehow politically and spiritually unique, destined to forge not simply a
17. See id. at 99-100.
18. See, e.g., JOHN J. MILLER & MARK MOLESKY, OUR OLDEST ENEMY: A HISTORY OF
AMERICA'S DISASTROUS RELATIONSHIP WITH FRANCE (2004); KENNETH R. TIMMERMAN, THE
FRENCH BETRAYAL OF AMERICA (2004); RICHARD Z. CHESNOFF, THE ARROGANCE OF THE
FRENCH: WHY THEY CAN'T STAND US-AND WHY THE FEELING IS MUTUAL (2005); DENIS
BOYLES, VILE FRANCE: FEAR, DUPLICITY, COWARDICE AND CHEESE (2005).
19. See, e.g., DAVID W. NOBLE, DEATH OF A NATION: AMERICAN CULTURE AND THE END
OF EXCEPTIONALISM (2002); CHARLES LOCKHART, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM:
HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE (2003); Is AMERICA DIFFERENT? A NEW LOOK AT
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM (Byron E. Shafer ed., 1991).
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new nation but an original genus of civilization, a kind of new harmony out
of the transatlantic wilderness. 20 But just how accurate was this national self-
perception? Has it survived intact into the twentieth-century world of indus-
trial development and economic underdevelopment, technological invention
and military intervention, violence and war? And what concrete conse-
quences has it had for politics and society?
Does it, for example, explain why, in Werner Sombart's phrase, "There
is No Socialism in the United States? '21 While many political historians and
social commentators used the concept of American exceptionalism to explain
why neither socialism nor Marxism enjoyed the sort of intellectual credibility
or popular embrace in America that they had achieved in Europe by the end
of the Second World War, the decades following the elections of Ronald
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, the international export (and not just to
Western Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union) of Reaganomics or, later,
neoclassical laissez faire and globalization, seemed to render the differences
between the United States and Europe, which had appeared in such sharp
outline as recently as the Euro-Communist bid for power in Italy and France,
much less visible. The rise of southern rim (or sunbelt) states (and their eco-
nomic power bases, including military bases) in the United States-and the
Californiaization (as some called it) of America-only foreshadowed a
seemingly unstoppable Americanization of Europe. The more Europe was
like the United States, the less exceptional America would inevitably be-
come.
22
So if the United States and Europe, including France, are more and
more like each other, at least in the grand scale of things, why should the
United States and France have such a bitter falling out now? Another way of
asking this question is to inquire why, with Europe so far along the road of
unification, with all that means, should France, in 2005, vote against Euro-
pean constitutionalism in a much-watched national referendum, thus veering
off the main highway onto a side trip of its own? And why should the Neth-
erlands, for that matter, wish to join France, breaking out of the pack to chart
another stray national itinerary? Amsterdam and Paris would appear, almost
single-handedly, to have dynamited Europe's road to utopia--symbolized
first and foremost by the American-style economic prosperity promised by
the European Union's bureaucratic ruling elite in Brussels.
20. See DEBORAH L. MADSEN, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM (1998).
21. WERNER SOMBART, WHY Is THERE No SOCIALISM IN THE UNITED STATES? 23 (C.T.
Husbands ed., Patricia M. Hocking & C.T. Husbands trans., Int'l Arts & Sciences Press, Inc.
1976) (1906).
22. See MIKE DAVIS, PRISONERS OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (1986).
[Vol. 30:2:209
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An acute observation on the outcome of the 2005 European constitu-
tional referendum provides us with a useful key to understanding more than
just the Franco-Dutch shredding of the Europeans Unions' vaunted roadmap.
According to Jean-Christophe Cambad6lis, a French Deputy from Paris'
nineteenth arrondissement, the no vote represented "la victoire posthume de
Georges Marchais sur Frangois Mitterrand. '23 Georges Marchais, general
secretary of the French Communist Party for twenty-two years (1972-94),
and Francois Mitterand, leader of the Socialist Party in France and president
of the country for a key decade-and-a-half (1981-95), are indeed both dead.
But Cambadelis sees the French rejection of E.U. constitutionalism as a
postmortem victory for Marchais in the sense that Marchais not only boister-
ously opposed Mitterand's efforts to reconcile a tepid socialism with free-
market capitalism during the Reagan years but also vigorously countered
Mitterand's love affair with the Common Market and its successor, the
European Economic Community, with a deeply French version of what
Benedetto, Browne, and Quaglia label "Euroscepticism. ' 24
In spite of the fact that the two most successful political parties in recent
French national elections represented the center-right and the far-right, the
French left still has sufficient political clout to throw a roadblock onto the
Autobahn, so to speak, the fast track to one Europe. It is that same left which
is today even more skeptical of America than of Europe and firmly plants its
feet in the soil rather than being dragged along on elite projects like the crea-
tion of a single state in Europe or a single definition of freedom, imposed by
American militarism, around the world. And this explains much of French
hostility to America's Middle Eastern ambitions. To the consternation of
pro-American right-wing political philosophers who have come to dominate
the French intellectual scene in the past couple of decades, French conserva-
tives, not least of all President Jacques Chirac, often publicly and dramati-
cally opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 as well.
But just as the conservatives alone could not persuade the French to
rubber stamp the E.U. Constitution, they could not have placed France in so
prominent a position of resistance to American foreign policy as has been the
case since the U.N. Security Council debacle of 2003. But if the enduring
23. Posting of Jean-Christophe Cambad6lis to Journal d'un Chou,
http://chourka.canalblog.com/archives/2005/05/31 (May 31, 2005, 08:47 CET); Posting of
Isabelle Mandraud to Bella Ciao, http://bellaciao.org/fr/article.php3?idarticle=15691 (May
31, 2005, 00:03 CET). For an excellent analysis of the larger causes of France's resounding
"Non," see Robin Blackburn, Capital and Social Europe, 34 NEw LEFT REV. 87 (2005).
24. GIACOMO BENEDETTO ET AL., EUROSCEPTICISM AMONG WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST
PARTIES IN FRANCE, SPAIN AND ITALY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2004), available at
http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2004/benedetto.pdf.
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left-wing quality of French political culture helps explain the tension be-
tween an increasingly conservative America25 and France today, what ex-
plains this "path-dependency ' 26 of French politics, this habitual adherence to
a dialectical field of political (and social) conflict within which the left looms
large-before, during, and after the Soviet experiment in Russia? Political
scientist Mark Lilla, in an insightful essay comparing Anglo-American and
Continental philosophical traditions, argues that there has been a sharp divide
between the two approaches and asserts that "[t]he estrangement of political
philosophy in the two traditions had . . . concrete causes." Those causes
were, says Lilla, "not surprisingly, political. 27
In other words, the chasm separating American and European, espe-
cially French (in Lilla's critique), political philosophy reflected, in fact, a
concrete and decisive separation between American and French political
history and social experience, not just philosophy. That conflict emerged
most clearly from the French Revolution forward. "French political debate
in the nineteenth century," claims Lilla, following the work of noted French
historian, Frangois Furet, "devolved into contentious struggles over the revo-
lutionary heritage that largely excluded the kind of liberal politics that devel-
oped in England and America. '28 How could contrasting perspectives on the
French Revolution shape French philosophy, indeed French politics, decade
in and decade out, from the Revolution to the present, long after the Revolu-
tion itself was consigned to dusty textbooks in dilapidated libraries and mu-
seums? To be sure, observes Lilla, the "Revolution was over. But to those
intellectuals for whom the Revolution was an eternal process, ever to be ex-
tended and reconceived ... the Revolution was internationalized, with the
French Communist Party (PCF) and the Soviet Union now serving as honor-
ary sans-culottes. "29 While, to be sure, the Soviet Union is no longer and the
PCF and the French left are alive and well (as the E.U. constitutional refer-
endum made transparent), it is to the theory and practice of the French left
which, in effect, Mark Lilla opposes the contemporary practice of American
politics and imperial outreach. Thus, in an attempt to come to terms with the
contemporary relationship between the United States and France, between
French law and politics and America's version of the same institutions and
25. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE RIGHT NATION:
CONSERVATIVE POWER IN AMERICA (2005).
26. W1KIPEDIA, PATH DEPENDENCE, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pathdependence (last
visited Feb. 8, 2006).
27. Mark Lilla, The Legitimacy of the Liberal Age, in NEW FRENCH THOUGHT: POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 3, 3 (Mark Lilla ed., 1994).
28. Id. at7.
29. Id. at 10 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 30:2:209
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systems, we can reasonably begin by taking a closer look at the French
Revolution--especially at how it has been represented in French popular
culture.
IV. THE GREAT REVOLUTION
Italian filmmaker, Roberto Rossellini, once remarked that Karl Marx
dreamed of a society without classes and without government, the very ideals
of the American Revolution. One might ask whose American Revolution did
Rossellini have in mind? That of the New England merchants or Boston's
poor? Of Alexander Hamilton or Tom Paine? Just as the premier Russian
movie director, Sergei Eisenstein, never managed to make a film out of Marx
Capital, a project on which he had set his sights for years, Rossellini failed to
get around to making a movie about the American Revolution. Others did,
however, as mentioned above, though perhaps fewer in number than one
might expect. The French Revolution, by contrast, has attracted novelists
and filmmakers like flies.
Will it continue to do so? Sociologist Barrington Moore, writing during
the decade of the 1960s, placed the Bolshevik Revolution in a direct line of
descent from the French.30 As Mark Lilla suggests, it is well known that
debates within modem French historiography over the revolution of 1789,
the "Great Revolution," have often been nothing more than arguments cam-
ouflaging bitter disagreement over socialism, communism, and the revolu-
tions they have inspired." Does the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the
end of the twentieth century, and America's "victory" in the Cold War, sig-
nal it is high time to reevaluate the relationship between these two extraordi-
nary, late-eighteenth-century revolutions? If Americans now see their revo-
lution, and the legal and political system it founded, as a model for the rest of
the world's nations to emulate, does that not place France's revolution in-
creasingly in the shadow, a discredited progenitor of failed left-wing social
movements and, in power, botched schemes for a worker's paradise? We
shall have to wait and see.
In a catalogue accompanying the 1983 Rediscovering French Film ex-
hibition organized by New York's Museum of Modem Art and France's
Ministry of Culture, curator Richard Roud describes Abel Gance's French
Revolution film, Napolgon, which premiered at the Paris Opera House in
30. BARRINGTON MOORE JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY: LORD
AND PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 112 (reprint 1993) (1966).
31. Lilla, supra note 27, at 10.
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1927, as one of the "milestones in the history of world cinema. 32 Napolion
certainly deserves as much as any film ever made to be designated as avant-
garde or ahead of its time.33 Gance, the film's director, not only pioneered
an editing process which employed a rapid and rhythmically compelling
mode of inter-cutting powerful images but also invented the use of hand-held
cameras-later utilized so successfully by French Nouvelle Vague and ci-
ndma vgritj filmmakers-image distorting lenses, and what Gance called
Polyvision. The latter process involved first shooting, then projecting onto a
screen, three separate images arranged horizontally, creating both a wide-
screen and split-screen effect which, not surprisingly, overwhelmed early
film-goers. Also relying upon a range of masking devices (familiar from
D.W. Griffith's movies) and even a 275mm telephoto lens, Gance estab-
lished himself, according to film historians David Bordwell and Kristin
Thompson, as the boldest innovator in the history of film technology.34
A minority of critics, over the past eighty years, have resisted the seduc-
tive force of Gance's Napoleon and refused to be enlisted by its furious en-
thusiasms, decrying it as Hollywood spectacle gone mad. For example, in
the film's sequence during which a youthful officer presents the Revolution
with its anthem, or Napoleon's trial at sea in which the raging storm against
which he struggles is inter-cut with the political storm raging in the legisla-
tive convention back in Paris, or in the sequence near the end of the film in
which, as army commander in the Italian campaign, Napoleon is visited by
the ghosts of the Revolution, the leaders whose authority he inherits, some
critics have seen Gance's transformation of historical forces into those of
nature, personality, and spirit as defects in his narrative technique.
The personification of history seems typical of Hollywood's own ver-
sion of historical spectacle. Describing Jean Renoir's film of the French
Revolution, La Marseillaise (1938), made a decade after Napolion, Jonathan
Buchsbaum says that Renoir specifically sought to avoid making just another
Hollywood historical epic or its French equivalent, hysterical drama like
Gance's Napolion.35 A critic for the politically-oriented Cineaste magazine
even accused Gance of employing an essentially fascist cinematic technique.
Attribution of politics to aesthetic technique alone often seems over-
drawn. Perhaps less so in Brecht's famous theory of alienation effect, but
32. Richard Roud, Introduction to REDISCOVERING FRENCH FILM 13, 21 (Mary Lea Bandy
ed., 1983).
33. See ABEL GANCE, NAPOLEON (Bambi Ballard ed., Moya Hassan trans., Faber & Faber
Ltd. 1990) (1927); NORMAN KING, ABEL GANCE: A POLITICS OF SPECTACLE (1984).
34. DAVID BORDWELL & KRISTIN THOMPSON, FILM ART: AN INTRODUCTION 90
(McGraw-Hill, 2003) (2001).
35. JONATHAN BUCHSBAUM, CINEMA ENGAGt: FILM IN THE POPULAR FRoNT 258 (1988).
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when both Godard and Luc Mollet write in Cahiers du Cinima that a travel-
ing (or tracking) shot is a moral statement, you have to wonder exactly what
they mean. A specific motion picture image, shot in a certain way, can se-
cure a political meaning just as it can any other kind of meaning. Eisen-
stein's "montage," or juxtaposition of successive images of stone lions that
appear to be rising to their feet in anger during the Odessa Steps massacre
sequence in The Battleship Potemkin (1925) provides a familiar illustration.
This kind of inter-cutting between two different sets or streams of images,
used by Godard and other French New Wave filmmakers as well as Gance
and Eisenstein before them, constitutes one of the elementary principles of
Rudolph Arnheim's psychological theory of film technique.
But the "form is content" theory actually goes further and posits, for ex-
ample, that Eisenstein's method of editing is itself a political or ideological
statement. Its defenders usually argue that it is a Marxist approach to film-
making, but by the time Godard's own approach to making movies had
evolved to the point, revealed at the end of Weekend (1968), where he be-
lieved the history of cinema had come to an end, he regarded Eisenstein's
Potemkin as a right-wing film simply because it retained evidence of conven-
tional narrative or story-telling strategies. Another director, Constantine
Costa-Gavras, expressed surprise at Godard's statement-recalling that Po-
temkin had an unmistakably left-wing influence on his generation of film-
makers. It is fine for Godard to glibly observe, for example, that you cannot
make left-wing films on a right-wing editing table, but again, how does that
translate into a coherent political idea about film practice?
In any event, Abel Gance's effort to tell the story of the French Revolu-
tion through his depiction of the life of a single man, Napoleon Bonaparte,
makes sense in the context of real French history. Within a few years of the
Corsican's arrival on the scene, as E.J. Hobsbawm reminds us, "France had a
Civil Code, a concordat with the Church and even, most striking symbol of
bourgeois stability, a National Bank., 36 Of course, there is a limit to the im-
pact of a single individual on history--even a Napoleon, as they say.
"[M]ost-perhaps all-[Napoleon's] ideas," Hobsbawm acknowledges,
"were anticipated by Revolution and Directory."37 If, as is certainly the case,
Napoleon eventually drew the line on the Jacobin project of social emancipa-
tion, the dreams of Robespierre and Jean-Paul Marat, the Jacobin revolution-
ary sensibility still managed to survive the legend of Napoleon.
In the section of Gance's film titled, Thermidor, following the inter-
title, a mask shot is used to reveal the Convention in turmoil. Along with the
36. E.J. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF REVOLUTION: EUROPE 1789-1848, at 74 (1962).
37. Id. at 75.
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well-dressed politicians, the chamber is now flooded with George Rude's
"crowd,"3 8 and there are calls of "Death to Saint-Just!" and "Death to
Robespierre," as a reaction sets in. "Death to the monsters!" is cried by a
shiftless rabble that has suddenly turned against the Revolution. Robespi-
erre, begging to be given a chance to speak, is simply shouted down. One of
his opponents raises a dagger and promises to stab this "new Cromwell" if
the "Convention lacks the courage to indict him." With another knife, held
in the trembling hand of Charlotte Corday, those most frightened by and bit-
ter toward the Revolution have already murdered Marat in his bathtub--an
historical incident filmed by Gance with great deference to the Republican
painter Jacque-Louis David, who as a revolutionary Deputy voted for the
execution of King Louis XVI and would later paint the most noble of
Marat's portraits.
Finally, after a couple of false starts, Saint-Just, played by Abel Gance
himself, obtains the podium. This scene, in which Saint-Just is able to win
over the assembled mass, even though his personal fate may already be
sealed, is one of the true glories not only of Gance' s career but of the history
of French film. "Yes, we had to have victims," says Saint-Just, "but is not
the Revolution a great beacon lit upon tombs?" Gance cuts to a close-up of
Saint-Just's face which now fills the screen. "Have you forgotten that during
this time we have created for you a France that is new and ready to be lived
in?" Here Gance gives focus to the beautiful face of Violine Fleuri, one of
his characters in the film, who is obviously moved by these words. "And we
have done all this," cries Saint-Just, again in close-up, "with that vulture, the
Vendee, at our flanks, and on our shoulders that mass of tigers, the kings!"
A medium shot of the crowd, now standing and clapping, follows along with
one of Robespierre, stony-faced, then Saint-Just, again, like a cat ready to
strike: "You can now scatter our limbs to the four winds-Republics will
rise up from them!" Saint-Just glances upward, as he concludes his fiery
polemic, and most of the listeners in the packed hall rise to their feet, ap-
plauding wildly. Robespierre stoically stands and embraces Saint-Just.39
V. CONCLUSION
Like Saint-Just, the German philosopher, G.W.F. Hegel, decried the
abolition of equality in wealth, that political gambit Hegel believed had led
directly to the decline of the great republics in classical antiquity. "There
38. GEORGE RUDI, THE CROWD IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 178-79 (Reprint 1960).
39. For a relatively brief but interesting biography of Gance's character, in English, see
NORMAN HAMPSON, SAINT-JUST (Blackwell, 1991). See also, BERNARD VINOT, SAINT-JUST
(1985).
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was no longer any activity for the whole," wrote Georg Lukacs in his book
on Hegel, "for an idea--each man either laboured for himself or was forced
to work for another.... All political freedom faded away; the law only gave
the citizen a right to the security of property, the pursuit of which now filled
his entire life."' The republican values Hegel saw personified in Napoleon,
a world-historical figure, and his victory at Jenna in 1806; that Robespierre
and Saint-Just saw in the Great Revolution; that Lukacs saw in the revolu-
tionary social movements which derived hard lessons as well as inspiration
from the fierce Jacobin commitment to freedom-all this can be felt build-
ing, moment by moment, throughout Abel Gance's compelling cinematic
tribute to the utopian aspirations of French political history.
Would one be wrong to regard this aspiration as the real French Consti-
tution, the political and moral dynamic animating the Civil Code and its ef-
forts to undercut the undemocratic authority of judges and generals and even
bureaucrats in Brussels? Can we be surprised that French republicanism
should produce a foreign policy---or legal process--contrary to that gener-
ated by American liberalism, a political and constitutional ideology with
which we, on this side of the Atlantic, have lived for much too long?
40. GEORG LuKAcs, THE YOUNG HEGEL: STUDIES IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN
DIALECTICS AND ECONOMICS 47 (Rodney Livingstone trans., The Merlin Press 1975) (citations
omitted).
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